Advanced eBPF Security Patterns for Cloud-Native Kubernetes Environments#

1
# Identity-based NetworkPolicy with Cilium
2
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
3
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
4
metadata:
5
  name: api-server-policy
6
  namespace: production
7
spec:
8
  endpointSelector:
9
    matchLabels:
10
      app: api-server
11
      version: v2
12
  ingress:
13
    - fromEndpoints:
14
        - matchLabels:
15
            app: frontend
16
            environment: production
17
      toPorts:
18
        - ports:
19
            - port: "8080"
20
              protocol: TCP
21
          rules:
22
            http:
23
              - method: "GET"
24
                path: "/api/v2/.*"
25
    - fromEndpoints:
26
        - matchLabels:
27
            app: admin-console
28
      toPorts:
29
        - ports:
30
            - port: "8080"
31
              protocol: TCP
32
          rules:
33
            http:
34
              - method: ".*" # Admin can use all methods
35
  egress:
36
    - toEndpoints:
37
        - matchLabels:
38
            app: database
39
            environment: production
40
      toPorts:
41
        - ports:
42
            - port: "5432"
43
              protocol: TCP
44
    - toFQDNs:
45
        - matchPattern: "*.internal.company.com"
46
      toPorts:
47
        - ports:
48
            - port: "443"
49
              protocol: TCP

1
// eBPF program for identity-based filtering
2
SEC("cgroup/skb")
3
int identity_filter(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
4
    // Extract packet information
5
    struct packet_info pkt = {};
6
    if (extract_packet_info(skb, &pkt) < 0)
7
        return TC_ACT_OK;
8

9
    // Get source and destination identities
10
    struct identity *src_id = get_identity(pkt.src_ip, pkt.src_port);
11
    struct identity *dst_id = get_identity(pkt.dst_ip, pkt.dst_port);
12

13
    if (!src_id || !dst_id)
14
        return TC_ACT_OK;  // No identity, allow for now
15

16
    // Check policy based on identities
17
    struct policy_decision decision = check_policy(src_id, dst_id, &pkt);
18

19
    if (decision.action == POLICY_DENY) {
20
        // Log security event
21
        struct security_event evt = {
22
            .type = EVT_POLICY_DENIAL,
23
            .src_identity = src_id->id,
24
            .dst_identity = dst_id->id,
25
            .timestamp = bpf_ktime_get_ns(),
26
        };
27
        security_events.perf_submit(ctx, &evt, sizeof(evt));
28
        return TC_ACT_SHOT;
29
    }
30

31
    // Apply additional actions (encryption, marking, etc.)
32
    if (decision.encrypt) {
33
        mark_for_encryption(skb, decision.encryption_key_id);
34
    }
35

36
    return TC_ACT_OK;
37
}

1
// Kubernetes operator for dynamic identity management
2
type IdentityManager struct {
3
    client     kubernetes.Interface
4
    ciliumClient cilium.Interface
5
    cache      *IdentityCache
6
}
7

8
func (im *IdentityManager) AssignIdentity(pod *v1.Pod) (*Identity, error) {
9
    // Generate identity based on pod labels and namespace
10
    identity := &Identity{
11
        ID:        generateIdentityID(pod),
12
        Namespace: pod.Namespace,
13
        Labels:    pod.Labels,
14
        ServiceAccount: pod.Spec.ServiceAccountName,
15
    }
16

17
    // Add SPIFFE identity for mTLS
18
    identity.SPIFFE = fmt.Sprintf("spiffe://cluster.local/ns/%s/sa/%s",
19
        pod.Namespace, pod.Spec.ServiceAccountName)
20

21
    // Store identity in eBPF map
22
    if err := im.updateIdentityMap(identity); err != nil {
23
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update identity map: %w", err)
24
    }
25

26
    // Create CiliumIdentity CRD
27
    ciliumIdentity := &ciliumv2.CiliumIdentity{
28
        ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{
29
            Name: fmt.Sprintf("identity-%d", identity.ID),
30
        },
31
        SecurityLabels: convertToSecurityLabels(identity.Labels),
32
    }
33

34
    _, err := im.ciliumClient.CiliumV2().CiliumIdentities().Create(
35
        context.TODO(), ciliumIdentity, metav1.CreateOptions{})
36

37
    return identity, err
38
}

1
// Rust implementation using Aya for container escape detection
2
use aya_ebpf::{
3
    macros::{lsm, map},
4
    maps::HashMap,
5
    programs::LsmContext,
6
};
7

8
#[map]
9
static mut CONTAINER_PROCESSES: HashMap<u32, ContainerInfo> =
10
    HashMap::with_max_entries(10000, 0);
11

12
#[lsm(hook = "bprm_check_security")]
13
pub fn detect_container_escape(ctx: LsmContext) -> i32 {
14
    match try_detect_escape(ctx) {
15
        Ok(action) => action,
16
        Err(_) => 0, // Allow on error
17
    }
18
}
19

20
fn try_detect_escape(ctx: LsmContext) -> Result<i32, i64> {
21
    let task = bpf_get_current_task();
22
    let pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
23

24
    // Check if process is in a container
25
    let container_info = unsafe { CONTAINER_PROCESSES.get(&pid) };
26

27
    if let Some(info) = container_info {
28
        // Get the binary being executed
29
        let bprm: *const linux_binprm = ctx.arg(0);
30
        let filename = unsafe {
31
            bpf_probe_read_kernel_str((*bprm).filename)?
32
        };
33

34
        // Detection patterns
35
        if is_escape_attempt(&filename, &info) {
36
            // Alert on potential escape
37
            let alert = ContainerEscapeAlert {
38
                timestamp: bpf_ktime_get_ns(),
39
                container_id: info.container_id,
40
                pid,
41
                filename,
42
                escape_type: detect_escape_type(&filename),
43
            };
44

45
            SECURITY_ALERTS.output(&alert, 0)?;
46

47
            // Optionally block the execution
48
            if should_block_escape(&alert) {
49
                return Ok(-EACCES);
50
            }
51
        }
52
    }
53

54
    Ok(0)
55
}
56

57
fn is_escape_attempt(filename: &str, container: &ContainerInfo) -> bool {
58
    // Pattern 1: Accessing host binaries
59
    if filename.starts_with("/host") || filename.contains("../") {
60
        return true;
61
    }
62

63
    // Pattern 2: Known escape tools
64
    const ESCAPE_TOOLS: &[&str] = &["nsenter", "setns", "unshare"];
65
    for tool in ESCAPE_TOOLS {
66
        if filename.contains(tool) {
67
            return true;
68
        }
69
    }
70

71
    // Pattern 3: Privileged operations in unprivileged container
72
    if !container.privileged && is_privileged_binary(filename) {
73
        return true;
74
    }
75

76
    false
77
}

1
# ML-based anomaly detection for container behavior
2
import numpy as np
3
from sklearn.ensemble import IsolationForest
4
from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler
5
import joblib
6

7
class ContainerAnomalyDetector:
8
    def __init__(self):
9
        self.model = IsolationForest(
10
            n_estimators=100,
11
            contamination=0.01,
12
            random_state=42
13
        )
14
        self.scaler = StandardScaler()
15
        self.feature_extractors = {
16
            'syscall_frequency': self.extract_syscall_features,
17
            'network_behavior': self.extract_network_features,
18
            'file_access': self.extract_file_features,
19
            'process_behavior': self.extract_process_features,
20
        }
21

22
    def extract_features(self, events):
23
        """Extract behavioral features from eBPF events"""
24
        features = []
25

26
        for extractor_name, extractor_func in self.feature_extractors.items():
27
            features.extend(extractor_func(events))
28

29
        return np.array(features)
30

31
    def extract_syscall_features(self, events):
32
        """Extract syscall-based features"""
33
        syscall_events = [e for e in events if e['type'] == 'syscall']
34

35
        # Feature 1: Syscall diversity
36
        unique_syscalls = len(set(e['syscall_id'] for e in syscall_events))
37

38
        # Feature 2: Rare syscall usage
39
        rare_syscalls = ['ptrace', 'setns', 'pivot_root', 'mount']
40
        rare_count = sum(1 for e in syscall_events
41
                        if e['syscall_name'] in rare_syscalls)
42

43
        # Feature 3: Syscall frequency
44
        syscall_rate = len(syscall_events) / max(1, events[-1]['timestamp'] - events[0]['timestamp'])
45

46
        return [unique_syscalls, rare_count, syscall_rate]
47

48
    def detect_anomalies(self, container_id, events):
49
        """Detect anomalies in container behavior"""
50
        features = self.extract_features(events)
51
        features_scaled = self.scaler.transform([features])
52

53
        # Predict anomaly
54
        is_anomaly = self.model.predict(features_scaled)[0] == -1
55
        anomaly_score = self.model.score_samples(features_scaled)[0]
56

57
        if is_anomaly:
58
            return {
59
                'container_id': container_id,
60
                'is_anomaly': True,
61
                'score': float(anomaly_score),
62
                'detected_patterns': self.analyze_anomaly_patterns(events),
63
                'recommendation': self.get_security_recommendation(events)
64
            }
65

66
        return None
67

68
    def analyze_anomaly_patterns(self, events):
69
        """Identify specific anomaly patterns"""
70
        patterns = []
71

72
        # Check for cryptocurrency mining
73
        if self.detect_crypto_mining(events):
74
            patterns.append('crypto_mining')
75

76
        # Check for lateral movement
77
        if self.detect_lateral_movement(events):
78
            patterns.append('lateral_movement')
79

80
        # Check for data exfiltration
81
        if self.detect_data_exfiltration(events):
82
            patterns.append('data_exfiltration')
83

84
        return patterns

1
// eBPF program for transparent TLS interception
2
SEC("sk_msg")
3
int tls_intercept(struct sk_msg_md *msg) {
4
    struct connection_info conn = {};
5

6
    // Extract connection information
7
    conn.src_ip = msg->remote_ip4;
8
    conn.dst_ip = msg->local_ip4;
9
    conn.src_port = bpf_ntohs(msg->remote_port);
10
    conn.dst_port = bpf_ntohs(msg->local_port);
11

12
    // Check if connection requires encryption
13
    struct encryption_policy *policy = lookup_encryption_policy(&conn);
14
    if (!policy) {
15
        return SK_PASS;  // No encryption required
16
    }
17

18
    // Mark for encryption offload
19
    if (policy->mode == ENCRYPT_MODE_TRANSPARENT) {
20
        // Set up transparent encryption
21
        struct tls_context *tls_ctx = get_or_create_tls_context(&conn);
22

23
        if (!tls_ctx) {
24
            // Log failure and decide on policy
25
            log_encryption_failure(&conn);
26
            return policy->fail_open ? SK_PASS : SK_DROP;
27
        }
28

29
        // Apply encryption context
30
        bpf_sk_msg_set_tls(msg, tls_ctx);
31
    }
32

33
    return SK_PASS;
34
}
35

36
// L7 protocol parsing and security
37
SEC("sk_skb/stream_parser")
38
int parse_l7_protocol(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
39
    // Parse application layer protocol
40
    struct l7_parser_state *state = get_parser_state(skb);
41

42
    if (!state) {
43
        // Initialize parser for new connection
44
        state = init_l7_parser(skb);
45
    }
46

47
    // Detect protocol
48
    enum l7_protocol proto = detect_protocol(skb, state);
49

50
    switch (proto) {
51
    case PROTO_HTTP:
52
        return parse_http_security(skb, state);
53
    case PROTO_GRPC:
54
        return parse_grpc_security(skb, state);
55
    case PROTO_KAFKA:
56
        return parse_kafka_security(skb, state);
57
    default:
58
        return TC_ACT_OK;
59
    }
60
}

1
# Advanced API security with Cilium Service Mesh
2
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
3
kind: CiliumEnvoyConfig
4
metadata:
5
  name: api-gateway-security
6
spec:
7
  services:
8
    - name: api-gateway
9
      namespace: production
10
  resources:
11
    - "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.config.listener.v3.Listener
12
      name: api-security-listener
13
      filter_chains:
14
        - filters:
15
            - name: envoy.filters.network.http_connection_manager
16
              typed_config:
17
                "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.network.http_connection_manager.v3.HttpConnectionManager
18
                stat_prefix: api_security
19
                route_config:
20
                  name: local_route
21
                  virtual_hosts:
22
                    - name: api_service
23
                      domains: ["*"]
24
                      routes:
25
                        - match:
26
                            prefix: "/api/"
27
                          route:
28
                            cluster: api-backend
29
                            rate_limits:
30
                              - actions:
31
                                  - request_headers:
32
                                      header_name: "x-api-key"
33
                                      descriptor_key: "api_key"
34
                            timeout: 30s
35
                http_filters:
36
                  # JWT Authentication
37
                  - name: envoy.filters.http.jwt_authn
38
                    typed_config:
39
                      "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.jwt_authn.v3.JwtAuthentication
40
                      providers:
41
                        oauth_provider:
42
                          issuer: "https://auth.company.com"
43
                          audiences:
44
                            - "api.company.com"
45
                          remote_jwks:
46
                            http_uri:
47
                              uri: "https://auth.company.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
48
                              cluster: auth-cluster
49
                            cache_duration:
50
                              seconds: 300
51
                      rules:
52
                        - match:
53
                            prefix: "/api/"
54
                          requires:
55
                            provider_name: "oauth_provider"
56

57
                  # WAF with ModSecurity
58
                  - name: envoy.filters.http.modsecurity
59
                    typed_config:
60
                      "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.modsecurity.v3.ModSecurity
61
                      rules: |
62
                        SecRuleEngine On
63
                        SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "nikto|sqlmap|havij" \
64
                          "id:1001,\
65
                          phase:1,\
66
                          t:lowercase,\
67
                          deny,\
68
                          msg:'Malicious scanner detected'"
69

70
                  # API Rate Limiting
71
                  - name: envoy.filters.http.ratelimit
72
                    typed_config:
73
                      "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.ratelimit.v3.RateLimit
74
                      domain: api_rate_limit
75
                      stage: 0
76
                      rate_limit_service:
77
                        grpc_service:
78
                          envoy_grpc:
79
                            cluster_name: rate_limit_cluster
80
                        transport_api_version: V3
81

82
                  # Custom eBPF security filter
83
                  - name: envoy.filters.http.ebpf_security
84
                    typed_config:
85
                      "@type": type.googleapis.com/custom.ebpf.security.v3.Security
86
                      program_path: "/opt/ebpf/api_security.o"
87
                      security_rules:
88
                        - name: "sql_injection_detection"
89
                          enabled: true
90
                        - name: "api_abuse_detection"
91
                          enabled: true
92
                          config:
93
                            threshold: 100
94
                            window: 60s

1
// Multi-cluster identity propagation
2
type MultiClusterIdentityManager struct {
3
    clusters    map[string]*ClusterClient
4
    meshConfig  *MeshConfiguration
5
    spireClient spire.Client
6
}
7

8
func (m *MultiClusterIdentityManager) FederateIdentity(
9
    ctx context.Context,
10
    identity *WorkloadIdentity,
11
) error {
12
    // Generate SPIFFE ID for workload
13
    spiffeID := &spire.SPIFFEID{
14
        TrustDomain: m.meshConfig.TrustDomain,
15
        Path: fmt.Sprintf("/ns/%s/sa/%s/cluster/%s",
16
            identity.Namespace,
17
            identity.ServiceAccount,
18
            identity.ClusterName,
19
        ),
20
    }
21

22
    // Register with SPIRE
23
    entry := &spire.Entry{
24
        SpiffeID: spiffeID.String(),
25
        Selectors: []spire.Selector{
26
            {Type: "k8s", Value: fmt.Sprintf("ns:%s", identity.Namespace)},
27
            {Type: "k8s", Value: fmt.Sprintf("sa:%s", identity.ServiceAccount)},
28
            {Type: "cluster", Value: identity.ClusterName},
29
        },
30
        FederatesWith: m.getFederatedDomains(identity),
31
    }
32

33
    if err := m.spireClient.CreateEntry(ctx, entry); err != nil {
34
        return fmt.Errorf("failed to register SPIFFE ID: %w", err)
35
    }
36

37
    // Propagate identity to other clusters
38
    for clusterName, client := range m.clusters {
39
        if clusterName == identity.ClusterName {
40
            continue // Skip origin cluster
41
        }
42

43
        // Check if cluster should receive this identity
44
        if !m.shouldPropagateToCluster(identity, clusterName) {
45
            continue
46
        }
47

48
        // Create remote identity
49
        remoteIdentity := &RemoteWorkloadIdentity{
50
            WorkloadIdentity: *identity,
51
            OriginCluster:    identity.ClusterName,
52
            SPIFFEID:        spiffeID.String(),
53
            FederatedDomains: entry.FederatesWith,
54
        }
55

56
        if err := client.CreateRemoteIdentity(ctx, remoteIdentity); err != nil {
57
            log.Printf("Failed to propagate identity to cluster %s: %v",
58
                clusterName, err)
59
        }
60
    }
61

62
    // Update eBPF maps across clusters
63
    return m.updateGlobalIdentityMaps(identity, spiffeID)
64
}
65

66
// eBPF-based cross-cluster traffic validation
67
func (m *MultiClusterIdentityManager) InstallCrossClusterPolicy(
68
    policy *CrossClusterNetworkPolicy,
69
) error {
70
    // Generate eBPF program for policy
71
    program := m.generatePolicyProgram(policy)
72

73
    // Deploy to all affected clusters
74
    for _, cluster := range policy.ApplicableClusters {
75
        client := m.clusters[cluster]
76

77
        // Load eBPF program
78
        if err := client.LoadeBPFProgram(program); err != nil {
79
            return fmt.Errorf("failed to load program in cluster %s: %w",
80
                cluster, err)
81
        }
82

83
        // Attach to cluster ingress/egress points
84
        attachPoints := []string{
85
            "cluster-ingress",
86
            "cluster-egress",
87
            "service-mesh-proxy",
88
        }
89

90
        for _, point := range attachPoints {
91
            if err := client.AttacheBPFProgram(program.Name, point); err != nil {
92
                return fmt.Errorf("failed to attach at %s: %w", point, err)
93
            }
94
        }
95
    }
96

97
    return nil
98
}

1
// Security-aware distributed tracing
2
use aya_ebpf::{
3
    macros::{uprobe, map},
4
    maps::HashMap,
5
    programs::UProbeContext,
6
};
7

8
#[repr(C)]
9
struct SecurityTrace {
10
    trace_id: [u8; 16],
11
    span_id: [u8; 8],
12
    parent_span_id: [u8; 8],
13
    timestamp: u64,
14
    duration: u64,
15
    security_context: SecurityContext,
16
    risk_score: u32,
17
    anomalies: u32,
18
}
19

20
#[repr(C)]
21
struct SecurityContext {
22
    identity_id: u32,
23
    permission_mask: u64,
24
    encryption_status: u8,
25
    authentication_method: u8,
26
    threat_indicators: u32,
27
}
28

29
#[map]
30
static mut SECURITY_TRACES: HashMap<[u8; 16], SecurityTrace> =
31
    HashMap::with_max_entries(100000, 0);
32

33
#[uprobe]
34
pub fn trace_security_context(ctx: UProbeContext) -> i32 {
35
    match try_trace_security(ctx) {
36
        Ok(_) => 0,
37
        Err(_) => 0,
38
    }
39
}
40

41
fn try_trace_security(ctx: UProbeContext) -> Result<(), i64> {
42
    // Extract trace context from function arguments
43
    let trace_ctx: *const TraceContext = ctx.arg(0)?;
44
    let trace_id = unsafe { (*trace_ctx).trace_id };
45

46
    // Get current security context
47
    let security_ctx = get_current_security_context()?;
48

49
    // Calculate risk score based on various factors
50
    let risk_score = calculate_risk_score(&security_ctx)?;
51

52
    // Detect anomalies
53
    let anomalies = detect_trace_anomalies(&trace_id, &security_ctx)?;
54

55
    // Create security trace entry
56
    let trace = SecurityTrace {
57
        trace_id,
58
        span_id: generate_span_id(),
59
        parent_span_id: unsafe { (*trace_ctx).parent_span_id },
60
        timestamp: bpf_ktime_get_ns(),
61
        duration: 0, // Will be updated on span end
62
        security_context: security_ctx,
63
        risk_score,
64
        anomalies,
65
    };
66

67
    // Store trace
68
    unsafe {
69
        SECURITY_TRACES.insert(&trace_id, &trace, 0)?;
70
    }
71

72
    // Alert on high-risk traces
73
    if risk_score > RISK_THRESHOLD || anomalies > 0 {
74
        emit_security_alert(&trace)?;
75
    }
76

77
    Ok(())
78
}
79

80
fn calculate_risk_score(ctx: &SecurityContext) -> Result<u32, i64> {
81
    let mut score = 0u32;
82

83
    // Factor 1: Authentication strength
84
    match ctx.authentication_method {
85
        AUTH_NONE => score += 50,
86
        AUTH_BASIC => score += 30,
87
        AUTH_TOKEN => score += 10,
88
        AUTH_MTLS => score += 0,
89
        _ => score += 20,
90
    }
91

92
    // Factor 2: Encryption status
93
    if ctx.encryption_status == 0 {
94
        score += 40;
95
    }
96

97
    // Factor 3: Permission scope
98
    let permission_count = ctx.permission_mask.count_ones();
99
    if permission_count > 10 {
100
        score += 20; // Too many permissions
101
    }
102

103
    // Factor 4: Known threat indicators
104
    if ctx.threat_indicators > 0 {
105
        score += ctx.threat_indicators * 10;
106
    }
107

108
    Ok(score.min(100))
109
}

1
// Real-time security metrics aggregation
2
interface SecurityMetrics {
3
  timestamp: number;
4
  cluster: string;
5
  namespace: string;
6
  metrics: {
7
    requests_per_second: number;
8
    error_rate: number;
9
    latency_p99: number;
10
    security_events: number;
11
    blocked_requests: number;
12
    authentication_failures: number;
13
    encryption_coverage: number;
14
    identity_violations: number;
15
  };
16
  anomalies: AnomalyEvent[];
17
}
18

19
class SecurityObservabilityService {
20
  private metricsBuffer: Map<string, SecurityMetrics[]> = new Map();
21
  private ebpfClient: EBPFClient;
22
  private prometheusClient: PrometheusClient;
23

24
  async collectSecurityMetrics(): Promise<void> {
25
    // Collect from eBPF maps
26
    const ebpfMetrics = await this.ebpfClient.getSecurityMetrics();
27

28
    // Aggregate by namespace
29
    const aggregated = this.aggregateMetrics(ebpfMetrics);
30

31
    // Detect anomalies
32
    for (const [key, metrics] of aggregated) {
33
      const anomalies = await this.detectAnomalies(key, metrics);
34
      if (anomalies.length > 0) {
35
        metrics.anomalies = anomalies;
36
        await this.handleSecurityAnomalies(anomalies);
37
      }
38
    }
39

40
    // Export to Prometheus
41
    await this.exportMetrics(aggregated);
42

43
    // Update real-time dashboard
44
    await this.updateDashboard(aggregated);
45
  }
46

47
  private async detectAnomalies(
48
    key: string,
49
    metrics: SecurityMetrics
50
  ): Promise<AnomalyEvent[]> {
51
    const anomalies: AnomalyEvent[] = [];
52

53
    // Get baseline from historical data
54
    const baseline = await this.getBaseline(key);
55

56
    // Check for request spike
57
    if (metrics.metrics.requests_per_second > baseline.rps_p99 * 2) {
58
      anomalies.push({
59
        type: "REQUEST_SPIKE",
60
        severity: "HIGH",
61
        value: metrics.metrics.requests_per_second,
62
        baseline: baseline.rps_p99,
63
        timestamp: Date.now(),
64
      });
65
    }
66

67
    // Check for authentication failures
68
    if (metrics.metrics.authentication_failures > baseline.auth_failures_p95) {
69
      anomalies.push({
70
        type: "AUTH_FAILURE_SPIKE",
71
        severity: "CRITICAL",
72
        value: metrics.metrics.authentication_failures,
73
        baseline: baseline.auth_failures_p95,
74
        timestamp: Date.now(),
75
      });
76
    }
77

78
    // Check for encryption coverage drop
79
    if (metrics.metrics.encryption_coverage < 0.95) {
80
      anomalies.push({
81
        type: "ENCRYPTION_COVERAGE_LOW",
82
        severity: "HIGH",
83
        value: metrics.metrics.encryption_coverage,
84
        baseline: 0.95,
85
        timestamp: Date.now(),
86
      });
87
    }
88

89
    return anomalies;
90
  }
91

92
  private async handleSecurityAnomalies(
93
    anomalies: AnomalyEvent[]
94
  ): Promise<void> {
95
    for (const anomaly of anomalies) {
96
      // Generate alert
97
      await this.alertingService.sendAlert({
98
        title: `Security Anomaly Detected: ${anomaly.type}`,
99
        severity: anomaly.severity,
100
        description: `Detected ${anomaly.type} with value ${anomaly.value} (baseline: ${anomaly.baseline})`,
101
        runbook: this.getRunbookUrl(anomaly.type),
102
        actions: this.getAutomatedActions(anomaly),
103
      });
104

105
      // Trigger automated response if configured
106
      if (this.config.enableAutoResponse) {
107
        await this.executeAutomatedResponse(anomaly);
108
      }
109
    }
110
  }
111
}

1
// CIS Kubernetes Benchmark compliance checking with eBPF
2
type ComplianceMonitor struct {
3
    ebpfPrograms map[string]*ebpf.Program
4
    auditLog     *AuditLogger
5
    violations   chan ComplianceViolation
6
}
7

8
func (cm *ComplianceMonitor) MonitorCISCompliance() error {
9
    // CIS 4.2.1 - Ensure that the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false
10
    if err := cm.monitorAnonymousAuth(); err != nil {
11
        return err
12
    }
13

14
    // CIS 4.2.2 - Ensure that the --basic-auth-file argument is not set
15
    if err := cm.monitorBasicAuth(); err != nil {
16
        return err
17
    }
18

19
    // CIS 4.2.6 - Ensure that the --streaming-connection-idle-timeout
20
    if err := cm.monitorStreamingTimeout(); err != nil {
21
        return err
22
    }
23

24
    // CIS 5.1.1 - Ensure that the cluster-admin role is only used where required
25
    if err := cm.monitorClusterAdminUsage(); err != nil {
26
        return err
27
    }
28

29
    // CIS 5.3.2 - Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined
30
    if err := cm.monitorNetworkPolicies(); err != nil {
31
        return err
32
    }
33

34
    return nil
35
}
36

37
func (cm *ComplianceMonitor) monitorClusterAdminUsage() error {
38
    // eBPF program to monitor cluster-admin role bindings
39
    prog := cm.ebpfPrograms["monitor_rbac"]
40

41
    // Attach to kube-apiserver audit points
42
    if err := prog.Attach(); err != nil {
43
        return err
44
    }
45

46
    // Process events
47
    go func() {
48
        for {
49
            var event RBACEvent
50
            if err := prog.ReadEvent(&event); err != nil {
51
                continue
52
            }
53

54
            if event.Role == "cluster-admin" {
55
                violation := ComplianceViolation{
56
                    Rule:        "CIS 5.1.1",
57
                    Severity:    "HIGH",
58
                    Description: "cluster-admin role used",
59
                    Resource:    event.Subject,
60
                    Evidence: map[string]interface{}{
61
                        "user":      event.User,
62
                        "action":    event.Action,
63
                        "timestamp": event.Timestamp,
64
                    },
65
                }
66

67
                cm.violations <- violation
68
                cm.auditLog.LogViolation(violation)
69
            }
70
        }
71
    }()
72

73
    return nil
74
}
75

76
// Automated remediation
77
func (cm *ComplianceMonitor) EnableAutoRemediation() {
78
    go func() {
79
        for violation := range cm.violations {
80
            switch violation.Rule {
81
            case "CIS 5.3.2": // Missing network policies
82
                cm.autoCreateNetworkPolicy(violation)
83
            case "CIS 5.1.1": // cluster-admin usage
84
                cm.alertSecurityTeam(violation)
85
            case "CIS 4.2.6": // Streaming timeout
86
                cm.updateAPIServerConfig(violation)
87
            }
88
        }
89
    }()
90
}

1
# Argo CD Application for security policies
2
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
3
kind: Application
4
metadata:
5
  name: security-policies
6
  namespace: argocd
7
spec:
8
  project: security
9
  source:
10
    repoURL: https://git.company.com/k8s-security
11
    targetRevision: main
12
    path: policies/production
13
    helm:
14
      valueFiles:
15
        - values-prod.yaml
16
      parameters:
17
        - name: ebpf.enabled
18
          value: "true"
19
        - name: enforcement.mode
20
          value: "strict"
21
  destination:
22
    server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
23
    namespace: kube-system
24
  syncPolicy:
25
    automated:
26
      prune: false # Don't auto-delete security policies
27
      selfHeal: true
28
    syncOptions:
29
      - CreateNamespace=false
30
      - PruneLast=true
31
    retry:
32
      limit: 5
33
      backoff:
34
        duration: 5s
35
        factor: 2
36
        maxDuration: 3m
37
  # Security-specific health checks
38
  health:
39
    - name: ebpf-programs
40
      check: |
41
        all(
42
          .status.programs[].state == "attached" &&
43
          .status.programs[].verified == true
44
        )
45
    - name: policy-coverage
46
      check: |
47
        .status.coverage.percentage >= 95

1
// Optimized eBPF program for high-scale environments
2
#define MAX_ENTRIES 1000000
3
#define BATCH_SIZE 64
4

5
// Use per-CPU maps for statistics
6
struct {
7
    __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY);
8
    __uint(max_entries, 1);
9
    __type(key, u32);
10
    __type(value, struct statistics);
11
} stats_map SEC(".maps");
12

13
// LRU hash for connection tracking
14
struct {
15
    __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH);
16
    __uint(max_entries, MAX_ENTRIES);
17
    __type(key, struct connection_key);
18
    __type(value, struct connection_state);
19
} conn_map SEC(".maps");
20

21
// Ring buffer for high-throughput event streaming
22
struct {
23
    __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
24
    __uint(max_entries, 16 * 1024 * 1024); // 16MB
25
} events_rb SEC(".maps");
26

27
SEC("cgroup/skb")
28
int optimized_filter(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
29
    // Early exit for non-relevant traffic
30
    if (skb->protocol != bpf_htons(ETH_P_IP))
31
        return TC_ACT_OK;
32

33
    // Batch processing hint
34
    #pragma unroll
35
    for (int i = 0; i < BATCH_SIZE; i++) {
36
        // Process multiple packets if available
37
        if (!process_packet_batch(skb, i))
38
            break;
39
    }
40

41
    // Update per-CPU statistics
42
    u32 key = 0;
43
    struct statistics *stats = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&stats_map, &key);
44
    if (stats) {
45
        __sync_fetch_and_add(&stats->packets, 1);
46
        __sync_fetch_and_add(&stats->bytes, skb->len);
47
    }
48

49
    return TC_ACT_OK;
50
}