Apple Private Cloud Compute: Revolutionary AI Privacy Architecture for Enterprise Security#

1
graph TD
2
    A[User Device] -->|Encrypted Request| B[PCC Node]
3
    B --> C[Secure Enclave Processor]
4
    C --> D[Ephemeral Storage]
5
    C --> E[Custom Apple Silicon]
6
    C --> F[Hardened OS]
7
    B -->|Encrypted Response| A
8

9
    G[Attestation Service] --> B
10
    H[Transparency Log] --> B
11

12
    style C fill:#f9f,stroke:#333,stroke-width:4px
13
    style D fill:#ff9,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

1
// Simplified representation of PCC hardware security
2
struct PCCSecurityProcessor {
3
    // Hardware-enforced memory encryption
4
    let memoryEncryption = AES256_GCM()
5

6
    // Secure boot chain verification
7
    let bootChain = [
8
        "iBoot Stage 1": "Verified by ROM",
9
        "iBoot Stage 2": "Verified by Stage 1",
10
        "Kernel": "Verified by Stage 2",
11
        "System Software": "Verified by Kernel"
12
    ]
13

14
    // Hardware attestation capabilities
15
    func generateAttestation() -> SecurityAttestation {
16
        return SecurityAttestation(
17
            deviceIdentity: getSecureEnclaveIdentity(),
18
            softwareVersion: getCurrentSoftwareHash(),
19
            bootMeasurements: measureBootChain(),
20
            timestamp: getSecureTimestamp()
21
        )
22
    }
23

24
    // Ephemeral key generation
25
    func generateEphemeralKeys() -> (public: Data, private: Data) {
26
        // Keys exist only in secure enclave
27
        // Destroyed after session completion
28
        return SecureEnclave.generateKeyPair(
29
            algorithm: .eciesEncryptionCofactorX963SHA256AESGCM,
30
            isExtractable: false,
31
            lifetime: .ephemeral
32
        )
33
    }
34
}

1
#!/usr/bin/env python3
2
# PCC Stateless Processing Simulation
3

4
import hashlib
5
import secrets
6
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
7
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2
8
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
9
import os
10

11
class PCCStatelessProcessor:
12
    """
13
    Simulates PCC's stateless processing model
14
    """
15

16
    def __init__(self):
17
        # No persistent state - everything is ephemeral
18
        self.session_key = None
19
        self.request_counter = 0
20

21
    def process_request(self, encrypted_request: bytes, attestation_token: str) -> bytes:
22
        """
23
        Process an AI request without storing any data
24
        """
25

26
        # Step 1: Verify attestation
27
        if not self.verify_attestation(attestation_token):
28
            raise SecurityError("Invalid attestation token")
29

30
        # Step 2: Generate ephemeral session key
31
        self.session_key = self.generate_ephemeral_key()
32

33
        # Step 3: Decrypt request in secure memory
34
        request_data = self.secure_decrypt(encrypted_request)
35

36
        # Step 4: Process AI workload (in-memory only)
37
        result = self.process_ai_workload(request_data)
38

39
        # Step 5: Encrypt response
40
        encrypted_response = self.secure_encrypt(result)
41

42
        # Step 6: Destroy all ephemeral data
43
        self.secure_cleanup()
44

45
        return encrypted_response
46

47
    def generate_ephemeral_key(self) -> bytes:
48
        """Generate a one-time use encryption key"""
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        return secrets.token_bytes(32)
50

51
    def secure_decrypt(self, ciphertext: bytes) -> bytes:
52
        """Decrypt data in secure memory region"""
53
        # In real PCC, this happens in hardware-isolated memory
54
        nonce = ciphertext[:12]
55
        tag = ciphertext[12:28]
56
        encrypted_data = ciphertext[28:]
57

58
        cipher = Cipher(
59
            algorithms.AES(self.session_key),
60
            modes.GCM(nonce, tag)
61
        )
62
        decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
63
        return decryptor.update(encrypted_data) + decryptor.finalize()
64

65
    def process_ai_workload(self, data: bytes) -> bytes:
66
        """
67
        Process AI request without any logging or persistence
68
        """
69
        # Simulate AI processing
70
        # In real PCC, this would invoke Apple Intelligence models
71

72
        # Critical: No logging, no caching, no side channels
73
        result = self.run_inference_in_memory(data)
74

75
        return result
76

77
    def secure_encrypt(self, plaintext: bytes) -> bytes:
78
        """Encrypt response with ephemeral key"""
79
        nonce = os.urandom(12)
80
        cipher = Cipher(
81
            algorithms.AES(self.session_key),
82
            modes.GCM(nonce)
83
        )
84
        encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
85
        ciphertext = encryptor.update(plaintext) + encryptor.finalize()
86

87
        return nonce + encryptor.tag + ciphertext
88

89
    def secure_cleanup(self):
90
        """
91
        Cryptographically erase all session data
92
        """
93
        if self.session_key:
94
            # Overwrite key material multiple times
95
            key_size = len(self.session_key)
96
            for _ in range(3):
97
                self.session_key = secrets.token_bytes(key_size)
98
            self.session_key = None
99

100
        # Force garbage collection
101
        import gc
102
        gc.collect()
103

104
    def verify_attestation(self, token: str) -> bool:
105
        """
106
        Verify hardware attestation token
107
        """
108
        # In production, this would verify:
109
        # 1. Hardware identity
110
        # 2. Software measurements
111
        # 3. Boot chain integrity
112
        # 4. Certificate chain to Apple root
113

114
        # Simplified verification
115
        expected_hash = hashlib.sha256(b"valid_pcc_node").hexdigest()
116
        return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16] == expected_hash[:16]
117

118
    def run_inference_in_memory(self, data: bytes) -> bytes:
119
        """
120
        Run AI inference entirely in memory
121
        """
122
        # Simulate AI processing without any disk I/O
123
        result_hash = hashlib.sha256(data).digest()
124
        return b"AI_RESULT:" + result_hash
125

126
# Demonstration
127
if __name__ == "__main__":
128
    processor = PCCStatelessProcessor()
129

130
    # Simulate a request
131
    test_request = b"Analyze this sensitive document"
132
    encrypted_request = secrets.token_bytes(100)  # Simulated encrypted data
133
    attestation = "valid_attestation_token"
134

135
    try:
136
        response = processor.process_request(encrypted_request, attestation)
137
        print(f"✅ Request processed securely")
138
        print(f"   Response size: {len(response)} bytes")
139
        print(f"   No data retained: {processor.session_key is None}")
140
    except Exception as e:
141
        print(f"❌ Processing failed: {e}")

1
#!/bin/bash
2
# PCC Security Verification Script
3

4
echo "=== Private Cloud Compute Security Verification ==="
5
echo "Version: 1.0.0"
6
echo "Date: $(date)"
7
echo ""
8

9
# Function to verify PCC binary transparency
10
verify_binary_transparency() {
11
    echo "Checking PCC Binary Transparency..."
12

13
    # Download latest PCC software manifest
14
    curl -s https://security.apple.com/pcc/manifest.json -o /tmp/pcc_manifest.json
15

16
    # Verify manifest signature
17
    openssl dgst -sha256 -verify apple_pcc_public.pem -signature manifest.sig /tmp/pcc_manifest.json
18

19
    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
20
        echo "✅ Manifest signature valid"
21
    else
22
        echo "❌ Manifest signature verification failed"
23
        return 1
24
    fi
25

26
    # Extract and verify individual component hashes
27
    jq -r '.components[] | "\(.name) \(.hash)"' /tmp/pcc_manifest.json | while read name hash; do
28
        echo "  Verifying component: $name"
29
        echo "    Expected hash: $hash"
30
    done
31
}
32

33
# Function to test PCC privacy guarantees
34
test_privacy_guarantees() {
35
    echo -e "\nTesting Privacy Guarantees..."
36

37
    # Test 1: Verify no persistent storage
38
    echo "  Test 1: Checking for persistent storage..."
39
    if [ -z "$(find /pcc/storage -type f 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
40
        echo "    ✅ No persistent files found"
41
    else
42
        echo "    ❌ Persistent storage detected"
43
    fi
44

45
    # Test 2: Verify network isolation
46
    echo "  Test 2: Checking network isolation..."
47
    ALLOWED_ENDPOINTS="17.0.0.0/8"  # Apple's IP range
48

49
    # Check active connections
50
    netstat -an | grep ESTABLISHED | grep -v "$ALLOWED_ENDPOINTS" > /tmp/unauthorized_connections
51

52
    if [ ! -s /tmp/unauthorized_connections ]; then
53
        echo "    ✅ Network properly isolated"
54
    else
55
        echo "    ❌ Unauthorized network connections detected:"
56
        cat /tmp/unauthorized_connections
57
    fi
58

59
    # Test 3: Memory encryption verification
60
    echo "  Test 3: Verifying memory encryption..."
61
    if sysctl -n machdep.pcc.memory_encryption 2>/dev/null | grep -q "enabled"; then
62
        echo "    ✅ Memory encryption active"
63
    else
64
        echo "    ⚠️  Cannot verify memory encryption status"
65
    fi
66
}
67

68
# Function to analyze PCC attestation
69
analyze_attestation() {
70
    echo -e "\nAnalyzing PCC Attestation..."
71

72
    # Request attestation from PCC node
73
    ATTESTATION=$(curl -s -X POST https://pcc.apple.com/attestation \
74
        -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
75
        -d '{"nonce": "'$(openssl rand -hex 16)'"}')
76

77
    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
78
        echo "  Attestation received successfully"
79

80
        # Parse attestation components
81
        echo "$ATTESTATION" | jq -r '
82
            "  Device ID: " + .device_id,
83
            "  Software Version: " + .software_version,
84
            "  Boot Chain Hash: " + .boot_chain_hash,
85
            "  Timestamp: " + .timestamp
86
        '
87

88
        # Verify attestation signature
89
        echo "$ATTESTATION" | jq -r '.signature' | base64 -d > /tmp/attestation.sig
90
        echo "$ATTESTATION" | jq -r '.data' | base64 -d > /tmp/attestation.data
91

92
        openssl dgst -sha256 -verify apple_attestation_public.pem \
93
            -signature /tmp/attestation.sig /tmp/attestation.data
94

95
        if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
96
            echo "  ✅ Attestation signature valid"
97
        else
98
            echo "  ❌ Attestation signature invalid"
99
        fi
100
    else
101
        echo "  ❌ Failed to obtain attestation"
102
    fi
103
}
104

105
# Main verification flow
106
main() {
107
    echo "Starting comprehensive PCC security verification..."
108
    echo "=================================================="
109

110
    verify_binary_transparency
111
    test_privacy_guarantees
112
    analyze_attestation
113

114
    echo -e "\n=================================================="
115
    echo "Verification complete. Check results above."
116
}
117

118
# Run verification
119
main

1
// TypeScript implementation for enterprise PCC integration
2

3
interface PCCConfiguration {
4
    endpoint: string;
5
    apiKey: string;
6
    maxRequestSize: number;
7
    timeout: number;
8
    verificationLevel: 'standard' | 'enhanced' | 'paranoid';
9
}
10

11
class EnterprisePCCClient {
12
    private config: PCCConfiguration;
13
    private attestationCache: Map<string, any>;
14

15
    constructor(config: PCCConfiguration) {
16
        this.config = config;
17
        this.attestationCache = new Map();
18
    }
19

20
    async processSecureAIRequest(
21
        data: any,
22
        model: string,
23
        requireAttestation: boolean = true
24
    ): Promise<any> {
25
        // Step 1: Prepare request with privacy metadata
26
        const request = this.preparePrivacyPreservingRequest(data, model);
27

28
        // Step 2: Obtain fresh attestation if required
29
        if (requireAttestation) {
30
            const attestation = await this.obtainAttestation();
31
            if (!this.verifyAttestation(attestation)) {
32
                throw new Error('PCC attestation verification failed');
33
            }
34
        }
35

36
        // Step 3: Establish secure channel
37
        const secureChannel = await this.establishSecureChannel();
38

39
        // Step 4: Send request through encrypted channel
40
        const response = await this.sendEncryptedRequest(
41
            secureChannel,
42
            request
43
        );
44

45
        // Step 5: Verify response integrity
46
        if (!this.verifyResponseIntegrity(response)) {
47
            throw new Error('Response integrity check failed');
48
        }
49

50
        // Step 6: Clean up secure channel
51
        await this.closeSecureChannel(secureChannel);
52

53
        return response.data;
54
    }
55

56
    private preparePrivacyPreservingRequest(data: any, model: string): any {
57
        return {
58
            payload: this.sanitizeData(data),
59
            model: model,
60
            privacy_level: 'maximum',
61
            audit_trail: false,  // No logging on PCC side
62
            ephemeral: true,      // No caching
63
            timestamp: Date.now(),
64
            nonce: this.generateNonce()
65
        };
66
    }
67

68
    private sanitizeData(data: any): any {
69
        // Remove any potential PII or tracking information
70
        const sanitized = { ...data };
71

72
        // Remove common PII fields
73
        const piiFields = ['ssn', 'email', 'phone', 'address', 'name'];
74
        piiFields.forEach(field => delete sanitized[field]);
75

76
        // Add differential privacy noise if configured
77
        if (this.config.verificationLevel === 'paranoid') {
78
            return this.addDifferentialPrivacyNoise(sanitized);
79
        }
80

81
        return sanitized;
82
    }
83

84
    private async obtainAttestation(): Promise<any> {
85
        const response = await fetch(`${this.config.endpoint}/attestation`, {
86
            method: 'POST',
87
            headers: {
88
                'Authorization': `Bearer ${this.config.apiKey}`,
89
                'Content-Type': 'application/json'
90
            },
91
            body: JSON.stringify({
92
                nonce: this.generateNonce(),
93
                timestamp: Date.now()
94
            })
95
        });
96

97
        return await response.json();
98
    }
99

100
    private verifyAttestation(attestation: any): boolean {
101
        // Verify attestation components
102
        const checks = [
103
            this.verifyDeviceIdentity(attestation.device_id),
104
            this.verifySoftwareVersion(attestation.software_version),
105
            this.verifyBootChain(attestation.boot_measurements),
106
            this.verifyTimestamp(attestation.timestamp),
107
            this.verifySignature(attestation.signature, attestation.data)
108
        ];
109

110
        return checks.every(check => check === true);
111
    }
112

113
    private async establishSecureChannel(): Promise<any> {
114
        // Implement TLS 1.3 with additional PCC-specific extensions
115
        const channel = {
116
            id: this.generateChannelId(),
117
            encryption: 'AES-256-GCM',
118
            keyExchange: 'ECDHE-P384',
119
            mac: 'HMAC-SHA384',
120
            sessionKey: await this.deriveSessionKey()
121
        };
122

123
        return channel;
124
    }
125

126
    private generateNonce(): string {
127
        const array = new Uint8Array(32);
128
        crypto.getRandomValues(array);
129
        return Array.from(array, byte => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
130
    }
131

132
    private generateChannelId(): string {
133
        return `pcc-channel-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9)}`;
134
    }
135

136
    private async deriveSessionKey(): Promise<CryptoKey> {
137
        const keyMaterial = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
138
            {
139
                name: 'ECDH',
140
                namedCurve: 'P-384'
141
            },
142
            true,
143
            ['deriveKey']
144
        );
145

146
        return keyMaterial.privateKey;
147
    }
148

149
    private addDifferentialPrivacyNoise(data: any): any {
150
        // Add Laplacian noise for differential privacy
151
        const epsilon = 1.0;  // Privacy budget
152
        const sensitivity = 1.0;  // Query sensitivity
153

154
        const addNoise = (value: number): number => {
155
            const scale = sensitivity / epsilon;
156
            const u = 0.5 - Math.random();
157
            const noise = -scale * Math.sign(u) * Math.log(1 - 2 * Math.abs(u));
158
            return value + noise;
159
        };
160

161
        // Apply noise to numeric fields
162
        const noisyData = { ...data };
163
        Object.keys(noisyData).forEach(key => {
164
            if (typeof noisyData[key] === 'number') {
165
                noisyData[key] = addNoise(noisyData[key]);
166
            }
167
        });
168

169
        return noisyData;
170
    }
171

172
    private verifyResponseIntegrity(response: any): boolean {
173
        // Verify HMAC
174
        const expectedHmac = this.calculateHmac(response.data);
175
        return response.hmac === expectedHmac;
176
    }
177

178
    private calculateHmac(data: any): string {
179
        // Simplified HMAC calculation
180
        const message = JSON.stringify(data);
181
        return crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(message))
182
            .then(hash => Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))
183
                .map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))
184
                .join(''));
185
    }
186

187
    private async sendEncryptedRequest(channel: any, request: any): Promise<any> {
188
        // Encrypt request with session key
189
        const encrypted = await this.encryptWithSessionKey(
190
            channel.sessionKey,
191
            JSON.stringify(request)
192
        );
193

194
        // Send to PCC endpoint
195
        const response = await fetch(`${this.config.endpoint}/process`, {
196
            method: 'POST',
197
            headers: {
198
                'Authorization': `Bearer ${this.config.apiKey}`,
199
                'X-Channel-ID': channel.id,
200
                'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream'
201
            },
202
            body: encrypted
203
        });
204

205
        const encryptedResponse = await response.arrayBuffer();
206

207
        // Decrypt response
208
        const decrypted = await this.decryptWithSessionKey(
209
            channel.sessionKey,
210
            encryptedResponse
211
        );
212

213
        return JSON.parse(decrypted);
214
    }
215

216
    private async encryptWithSessionKey(key: CryptoKey, data: string): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
217
        const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
218
        const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(data);
219

220
        const encrypted = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
221
            {
222
                name: 'AES-GCM',
223
                iv: iv
224
            },
225
            key,
226
            encoded
227
        );
228

229
        // Prepend IV to ciphertext
230
        const result = new Uint8Array(iv.length + encrypted.byteLength);
231
        result.set(iv, 0);
232
        result.set(new Uint8Array(encrypted), iv.length);
233

234
        return result.buffer;
235
    }
236

237
    private async decryptWithSessionKey(key: CryptoKey, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<string> {
238
        const dataArray = new Uint8Array(data);
239
        const iv = dataArray.slice(0, 12);
240
        const ciphertext = dataArray.slice(12);
241

242
        const decrypted = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
243
            {
244
                name: 'AES-GCM',
245
                iv: iv
246
            },
247
            key,
248
            ciphertext
249
        );
250

251
        return new TextDecoder().decode(decrypted);
252
    }
253

254
    private async closeSecureChannel(channel: any): Promise<void> {
255
        // Securely destroy session key
256
        if (channel.sessionKey) {
257
            // In a real implementation, this would trigger secure key deletion
258
            channel.sessionKey = null;
259
        }
260

261
        // Clear channel from cache
262
        this.attestationCache.delete(channel.id);
263
    }
264

265
    private verifyDeviceIdentity(deviceId: string): boolean {
266
        // Verify device ID against Apple's PCC fleet registry
267
        // This would check against a known list of valid PCC nodes
268
        return deviceId.startsWith('PCC-') && deviceId.length === 36;
269
    }
270

271
    private verifySoftwareVersion(version: string): boolean {
272
        // Ensure software version is current and unmodified
273
        const minVersion = '2025.1.0';
274
        return version >= minVersion;
275
    }
276

277
    private verifyBootChain(measurements: any[]): boolean {
278
        // Verify each stage of the boot process
279
        const expectedStages = ['iBoot1', 'iBoot2', 'Kernel', 'SystemSoftware'];
280
        return measurements.every((m, i) => m.stage === expectedStages[i] && m.valid);
281
    }
282

283
    private verifyTimestamp(timestamp: number): boolean {
284
        // Ensure attestation is fresh (within 5 minutes)
285
        const now = Date.now();
286
        const age = now - timestamp;
287
        return age >= 0 && age < 5 * 60 * 1000;
288
    }
289

290
    private verifySignature(signature: string, data: any): boolean {
291
        // Verify cryptographic signature using Apple's public key
292
        // This is a simplified representation
293
        return signature.length === 128;  // Expecting 512-bit signature
294
    }
295
}
296

297
// Usage example
298
async function demonstratePCCUsage() {
299
    const pccClient = new EnterprisePCCClient({
300
        endpoint: 'https://pcc.apple.com/api/v1',
301
        apiKey: process.env.PCC_API_KEY!,
302
        maxRequestSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024,  // 10MB
303
        timeout: 30000,  // 30 seconds
304
        verificationLevel: 'enhanced'
305
    });
306

307
    try {
308
        // Process sensitive document with AI
309
        const result = await pccClient.processSecureAIRequest(
310
            {
311
                document: 'Confidential financial report...',
312
                task: 'summarize',
313
                max_length: 500
314
            },
315
            'gpt-4-secure',
316
            true  // Require attestation
317
        );
318

319
        console.log('✅ AI processing completed securely');
320
        console.log('Summary:', result.summary);
321
        console.log('Privacy preserved: No data retained on servers');
322

323
    } catch (error) {
324
        console.error('❌ PCC processing failed:', error);
325
    }
326
}

1
# PCC Threat Model Configuration
2
threat_model:
3
  name: "Private Cloud Compute Security Analysis"
4
  version: "2025.1"
5
  classification: "Confidential"
6

7
  threat_actors:
8
    - name: "Nation State Adversary"
9
      capabilities: ["physical_access", "supply_chain", "zero_days"]
10
      objectives: ["data_exfiltration", "persistent_access"]
11

12
    - name: "Insider Threat"
13
      capabilities: ["admin_access", "source_code", "infrastructure"]
14
      objectives: ["data_theft", "sabotage"]
15

16
    - name: "Cloud Provider"
17
      capabilities: ["hypervisor_access", "network_control", "storage_access"]
18
      objectives: ["mass_surveillance", "data_mining"]
19

20
  security_boundaries:
21
    hardware:
22
      - boundary: "Secure Enclave Processor"
23
        protection: "Hardware-based key isolation"
24
        threat_mitigation:
25
          - "Physical tampering detection"
26
          - "Side-channel resistant design"
27
          - "Cryptographic attestation"
28

29
      - boundary: "Memory Encryption Engine"
30
        protection: "Real-time memory encryption"
31
        threat_mitigation:
32
          - "Cold boot attack prevention"
33
          - "DMA attack prevention"
34
          - "Memory scraping protection"
35

36
    software:
37
      - boundary: "Stateless Architecture"
38
        protection: "No persistent storage"
39
        threat_mitigation:
40
          - "Data remanence elimination"
41
          - "Forensic analysis prevention"
42
          - "Replay attack prevention"
43

44
      - boundary: "Sealed Software Stack"
45
        protection: "Immutable system software"
46
        threat_mitigation:
47
          - "Rootkit prevention"
48
          - "Privilege escalation blocking"
49
          - "Code injection prevention"
50

51
    network:
52
      - boundary: "End-to-End Encryption"
53
        protection: "Device-to-PCC encryption"
54
        threat_mitigation:
55
          - "Man-in-the-middle prevention"
56
          - "Traffic analysis resistance"
57
          - "Metadata protection"
58

59
      - boundary: "Request Routing Obfuscation"
60
        protection: "Randomized node selection"
61
        threat_mitigation:
62
          - "Traffic correlation prevention"
63
          - "Targeted interception blocking"
64
          - "Pattern analysis disruption"
65

66
  verification_requirements:
67
    continuous_monitoring:
68
      - metric: "Attestation verification rate"
69
        threshold: "100%"
70
        action: "Immediate disconnection on failure"
71

72
      - metric: "Memory encryption status"
73
        threshold: "Always enabled"
74
        action: "Halt processing if disabled"
75

76
      - metric: "Audit log presence"
77
        threshold: "Zero logs"
78
        action: "Alert if any logging detected"
79

80
    compliance_checks:
81
      - standard: "SOC 2 Type II"
82
        controls: ["Access Control", "Encryption", "Monitoring"]
83

84
      - standard: "ISO 27001"
85
        controls: ["Information Security", "Cryptography", "Incident Response"]
86

87
      - standard: "GDPR Article 25"
88
        controls: ["Privacy by Design", "Data Minimization", "Purpose Limitation"]

1
# Detection script for supply chain compromise
2
def detect_supply_chain_compromise():
3
    """
4
    Detect potential supply chain attacks on PCC components
5
    """
6

7
    integrity_checks = {
8
        'hardware': check_hardware_attestation(),
9
        'firmware': verify_firmware_signatures(),
10
        'software': validate_software_hashes(),
11
        'configuration': audit_system_configuration()
12
    }
13

14
    compromised_components = []
15

16
    for component, is_valid in integrity_checks.items():
17
        if not is_valid:
18
            compromised_components.append(component)
19

20
            # Immediate response
21
            if component == 'hardware':
22
                # Hardware compromise is critical
23
                initiate_emergency_shutdown()
24
                alert_security_team('CRITICAL: Hardware integrity failure')
25

26
            elif component in ['firmware', 'software']:
27
                # Software compromise can be remediated
28
                quarantine_node()
29
                initiate_remote_attestation()
30
                schedule_reimaging()
31

32
    return len(compromised_components) == 0

1
#!/bin/bash
2
# Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) detection for PCC
3

4
detect_apt_activity() {
5
    echo "Scanning for APT indicators in PCC environment..."
6

7
    # Check for persistence mechanisms
8
    PERSISTENCE_LOCATIONS=(
9
        "/Library/LaunchDaemons"
10
        "/Library/LaunchAgents"
11
        "/System/Library/LaunchDaemons"
12
        "/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd"
13
    )
14

15
    for location in "${PERSISTENCE_LOCATIONS[@]}"; do
16
        if [ -d "$location" ]; then
17
            # Look for suspicious entries
18
            find "$location" -type f -name "*.plist" -exec grep -l "PCC" {} \; | while read file; do
19
                # Verify signature
20
                codesign -dv "$file" 2>&1 | grep -q "Authority=Apple" || echo "⚠️  Unsigned: $file"
21
            done
22
        fi
23
    done
24

25
    # Check for anomalous network connections
26
    lsof -i -P | grep -E "PCC|ESTABLISHED" | awk '{print $2, $9}' | while read pid conn; do
27
        # Verify process legitimacy
28
        ps -p "$pid" -o comm= | grep -qE "^(pcc_daemon|swift)" || echo "⚠️  Suspicious PID: $pid"
29
    done
30

31
    # Monitor for data exfiltration attempts
32
    tcpdump -i any -n -s0 -w /tmp/pcc_capture.pcap &
33
    TCPDUMP_PID=$!
34
    sleep 10
35
    kill $TCPDUMP_PID
36

37
    # Analyze capture for anomalies
38
    tshark -r /tmp/pcc_capture.pcap -T fields -e frame.len | \
39
        awk '{sum+=$1; count++} END {if(count>0) print "Avg packet size:", sum/count}'
40
}

1
// Rust implementation of post-quantum cryptography for PCC
2

3
use pqcrypto_kyber::kyber1024;
4
use pqcrypto_dilithium::dilithium5;
5
use pqcrypto_traits::kem::*;
6
use pqcrypto_traits::sign::*;
7

8
pub struct QuantumResistantPCC {
9
    kem_keypair: (kyber1024::PublicKey, kyber1024::SecretKey),
10
    sign_keypair: (dilithium5::PublicKey, dilithium5::SecretKey),
11
}
12

13
impl QuantumResistantPCC {
14
    pub fn new() -> Self {
15
        // Generate quantum-resistant keypairs
16
        let (kem_pk, kem_sk) = kyber1024::keypair();
17
        let (sign_pk, sign_sk) = dilithium5::keypair();
18

19
        Self {
20
            kem_keypair: (kem_pk, kem_sk),
21
            sign_keypair: (sign_pk, sign_sk),
22
        }
23
    }
24

25
    pub fn establish_quantum_safe_channel(&self,
26
                                         peer_public_key: &kyber1024::PublicKey)
27
                                         -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
28
        // Encapsulate shared secret using Kyber
29
        let (shared_secret, ciphertext) = kyber1024::encapsulate(peer_public_key);
30

31
        // Sign the ciphertext for authentication
32
        let signature = dilithium5::sign(&ciphertext, &self.sign_keypair.1);
33

34
        // Combine for transmission
35
        let mut message = Vec::new();
36
        message.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
37
        message.extend_from_slice(&signature);
38

39
        Ok(shared_secret.as_bytes().to_vec())
40
    }
41

42
    pub fn verify_quantum_safe_attestation(&self,
43
                                          attestation_data: &[u8],
44
                                          signature: &[u8],
45
                                          public_key: &dilithium5::PublicKey)
46
                                          -> bool {
47
        // Verify using Dilithium signature
48
        match dilithium5::verify_detached(signature, attestation_data, public_key) {
49
            Ok(_) => true,
50
            Err(_) => false,
51
        }
52
    }
53
}